Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation
學年 104
學期 2
出版（發表）日期 2016-02-04
作品名稱 Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Chen, Shi; Tsai, Jeng-Yan; Jou, Rosemary
單位
出版者
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Applied Economics 48 (37), pp.3508-3525
摘要 The call options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to narrow-banking contingent claims of one bank, while the cap options theory is applied to synergy-banking contingent claims of another bank. This article investigates efficiency gains specified as equities of scope associated with the likelihood of the two banks involved in merger under capital regulation. We find that merger incentives are encouraged when the narrowing banking is conducted by the consolidated bank, whereas discouraged when the synergy banking is conducted. Raising bank capital requirement leads to an increased interest margin of the consolidated bank with the narrow banking valuation; however, to a decreased margin of the consolidated bank with the synergy banking valuation. An increase in the capital regulation reduces the merger incentives in the narrow banking valuation whereas increases the merger disincentive in the synergy banking valuation. These findings are consistent with the organizational theory that predicts a comparative advantage of narrow banking proposals in bank mergers.
關鍵字 Scope equities;merger;narrow banking;synergy banking;capital regulation
語言 en
ISSN 0003-6846;1466-4283
期刊性質 國外
收錄於 SSCI
產學合作
通訊作者 Tsai, Jeng-Yan
審稿制度 是
國別 GBR
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,電子版,紙本
相關連結

機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/110035 )