Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
學年 93
學期 2
出版（發表）日期 2005-03-01
作品名稱 Loan commitments, asymmetric information and capital regulation : an explanation for the synergy or narrow-banking management
作品名稱（其他語言）
著者 Lin, Jyh-horng ; Lii, Peirchyi ; Chang, Chuen-ping
單位 淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
出版者 Analytic Publishing Co
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 Journal of Information & Optimization Sciences 26(1), pp.143-163
摘要 We use a two-stage option-based model to study how Asymmetric information, capital requirements, loan commitment rate and the optimal loan rate relate to one another under an uncertain loan loss source. This model shows that there will be synergies between lending and deposit-taking to the extent that both require the bank to hold large liquid asset balances if its term loans and loan commitments are substitutes. Otherwise, narrow banking management is required by the bank. However, if the bank's term loans and loan commitments are substitutes (complements) and the bank conducts strategic substitutes (strategic complements), there is also real narrow banking. Our findings provide an alternative explanation for the synergy or narrow banking management, which answer the question: if there is real synergy (narrow banking), a forced switch to narrow banking (synergy) could lead to a large inefficiency.
關鍵字 Banking;asymmetric information;capital requirement;loan commitment
語言 en
ISSN 0252-2667
期刊性質 國外
收錄於
產學合作
通訊作者
審稿制度 否
國別 IND
公開徵稿
出版型式 ,紙本
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