期刊論文
| 學年 | 104 |
|---|---|
| 學期 | 1 |
| 出版（發表）日期 | 2015-10-01 |
| 作品名稱 | Principal-Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story |
| 作品名稱（其他語言） | |
| 著者 | Mor Sobol |
| 單位 | |
| 出版者 | |
| 著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | Governance 29(3), p.335-350 |
| 摘要 | Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms “pathological delegation.” In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon. |
| 關鍵字 | |
| 語言 | en |
| ISSN | 0952-1895 |
| 期刊性質 | 國外 |
| 收錄於 | SSCI |
| 產學合作 | |
| 通訊作者 | |
| 審稿制度 | 是 |
| 國別 | GBR |
| 公開徵稿 | |
| 出版型式 | ,電子版 |
| 相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/118133 ) |