期刊論文
學年 | 95 |
---|---|
學期 | 2 |
出版(發表)日期 | 2007-02-01 |
作品名稱 | 賣方管理存貨模式下存貨持有成本分攤之可行性分析 |
作品名稱(其他語言) | A Feasibility Analysis of Inventory Holding Cost Sharing on VMI Model |
著者 | 徐煥智 |
單位 | 淡江大學資訊管理學系 |
出版者 | 臺中市:中興大學企業管理系與財金系 |
著錄名稱、卷期、頁數 | 臺灣管理學刊=Taiwan Academy of Management Journal 7(1),頁89-101 |
摘要 | 在供應鏈的VMI (Vender-Managed Inventory)模式中,供應商必須制定適當的存貨政策以維護買方之存貨水準。這樣的想法使得供應商與買方之間形成一個策略夥伴的關係。然而要建立此種關係之前,有許多因素是必須加以考量的。Simchi-Levi等人(2000)在其著作中便指出存貨的歸屬權爭議是VMI推動成功與否的重要因素。實務上VMI的推動,有愈來愈多的廠商使用SBT(Scan Based Trading)的機制,在此機制下實質的產品所有權,在市場售出前都屬供應商所有。這樣的作業方式似乎對買方是絕對有利的,因為其不需分攤任何的存貨持有成本。而在本研究中我們利用Stackelberg賽局理論的概念,建構完成一個二階段的供應鏈存貨決策模式。並利用數值案例分析發現買方若能參予分攤賣方的存貨持有成本,在某些條件下雙方事實上能有機會同時節省更多的成本。 In a vendor managed inventory system, the supplier decides on the appropriate inventory policies to maintain the inventory level for the retailer. The idea makes the member of the supply chain become the strategic alliance. However, several issues must be considered when entering into the relationship. Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) pointed out that inventory ownership issues are critical to the success of VMI system. Some VMI partnerships are moving to a relationship called SBT (Scan Based Trading) in which the supplier owns the goods until they are sold. The benefit fo such a strategy to the retailer looks obvious - without inventory holding cost. In this research, we propose a new inventory decision model based on Stackelberg game theory. A numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of retails who wish to share the inventory holding cost. What we have discovered is if the retailer can share the cost, it may get greater economic benefit on the contrary. |
關鍵字 | 預付型服務;退出障礙;知覺價值;知覺風險;再購意願;Supply chain management;Vender-managed inventory;Scan based trading;Game theory |
語言 | zh_TW |
ISSN | 1680-8479 |
期刊性質 | 國內 |
收錄於 | |
產學合作 | |
通訊作者 | |
審稿制度 | |
國別 | TWN |
公開徵稿 | |
出版型式 | 紙本 |
相關連結 |
機構典藏連結 ( http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/53123 ) |